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of-use#LAAis needed during a particular context, and 
let E be the evidence for an element of said 
context. Then,
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where  P(E|Hi) determines the likelihood 
ratio that E is the case given Hi (i.e., the 
context factor), and P(Hi) gives the prior 
probability that a particular memory will 
be needed (i.e., the history factor). For pre-
sent purposes, two consequences that fol-
low from this formulation are relevant. First, 
as Anderson and Milson (1989) remarked, 
given the multiplicity of elements present in 
a retrieval context, the likelihood ratio repre-
senting the context factor is best understood 
as the multiplicative product of all the likeli-
hood ratios for every element of the context 
given Hi
1. As a result, certain contextual ele-
ments are going to be better cues than others 
(i.e., representing a larger positive contribu-
tion to the overall product), as it is the case 
with elements that were present in the con-
text of encoding (Craik and Tulving, 1975).
The second thing to notice is that the 
prior probability, according to the ACT-R 
model, depends on the history of previous 
retrievals. Originally, Anderson and Milson 
(1989) noted that determining the history 
factor could be daunting, if not impossible, 
as one “would have to follow people about 
their daily lives, keeping a complete record 
of when they use various facts [and] such an 
objective study of human information is close 
to impossible” (p. 705). To get around this 
problem, Anderson and Schooler (1991) sug-
gested extracting prior probabilities from the 
statistical distribution of existent   databases 
that, according to them, would capture 
“coherent slices of the environment.” One 
such environmental database, for instance, 
contained 2 years worth of word usage in the 
New York Times headlines. They found that 
the odds that a particular word was used in a 
certain headline was inversely correlated to its 
having occurred in a previous headline, with 
the probability diminishing the more time 
had passed since its last usage. Importantly, 
Anderson and Schooler (1991) showed that 
this model could fit extant data on recency 
and frequency effects on memory retrieval 
remarkably well2. Taken together, the context 
and the history factors suggest that the prob-
ability that a certain memory will be needed 
in a particular context can be predicted from 
the probability that it has been needed in the 
recent past in relevantly similar contexts. 
From the point of view of Clark’s HPM 
approach then, context and history factors 
combine in a hierarchical model that tries 
to find the most predictable memory – i.e., 
that which minimizes prediction error – for 
a needed memory given a cue3.
Clark (in press) has offered a forceful defense 
of the “hierarchical prediction machine” 
(HPM) approach to the brain. Roughly, HPM 
suggests that brains are in the business of mak-
ing sense of incoming information by gener-
ating top-down models aimed at providing 
the optimal fit for the input data. A better fit 
between the model and the data minimizes 
prediction error, which Clark – following 
Friston (e.g., Friston, 2010) – construes as tan-
tamount to reducing surprisal, i.e., “the sub-
personally computed implausibility of some 
sensory state given the model of the world” 
(p. 17). Notwithstanding the breadth of his 
defense, Clark’s case is entirely built upon 
research on perception, attention, and action, 
all of which are on-line cognitive processes. 
With practically no mention of offline cogni-
tion, the theoretical pretensions of the HPM 
approach, which Clark so vigorously defends 
as a “single unifying explanatory framework” 
(p. 61) in cognitive science, are questionable.
I suggest that this conspicuous absence 
might be partially remedied, at least for the 
case of remembering, by looking at recent 
Bayesian accounts of memory retrieval 
developed after Anderson’s Adaptive 
Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-
R) model (Anderson and Milson, 1989; 
Anderson, 1990; Anderson and Schooler, 
1991, 2000). Specifically, I suggest that the 
ACT-R model can be read as describing how 
memory retrieval attempts to minimize 
prediction error when finding the optimal 
memory given the costs of its retrieval and 
the organism’s current needs. Originally, the 
ACT-R model stated that remembering is a 
cognitive operation whose costs are offset by 
the gains attained when retrieval is success-
ful. As such, our adaptive memory system 
would search for a particular memory as 
long as the probability of recovering it given 
our current needs is greater than the costs 
of its retrieval. The ACT-R model captures 
this insight in Bayesian terms thus: let Hi 
be the hypothesis that a particular memory 
Predictive memory and the surprising gap
Felipe De Brigard*
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
*Correspondence: brigard@wjh.harvard.edu
Edited by:
Shimon Edelman, Cornell University, USA
Reviewed by:
Axel Cleeremans, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
1To reflect the fact that each element qj of the context 
E has a baseline probability of being associated to any 
other element, such as i, the likelihood ratio would 
have to be modified thus:
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2Notably,  Anderson (1993) proved that the ACT-R 
model for memory could be captured with the stan-
dard activation formulas of connectionist models. 
This fueled memory research on Bayesian approaches 
to neural networks, which draws yet another stark pa-
rallel with Clark’s HPM approach.
3Incidentally, ACT-R approach also dovetails nicely 
with one of the leading cognitive accounts of me-
mory retrieval: fuzzy trace theory. According to this 
view, remembering consists in the reconstruction of 
a previously encoded experience via the mutual co-
ordination of two processes: the retrieval of a gene-
ral gist of the encoded event plus the reinstatement 
of its distinctive (i.e., verbatim) details (Brainerd and 
Reyna, 2001). Dual-route models that assimilate the 
general gist to the prior probability and the verbatim 
information to the context factor show how the fuzzy 
trace theory of memory retrieval can be computatio-
nally implemented (Steyvers et al., 2006; Steyvers and 
Griffiths, 2008). Also, future research may illuminate 
connections between these approaches and recent 
proposals on the adaptive role of constructive me-
mory for predictions (Bar, 2009; Schacter and Addis, 
2009; Schacter, in press).
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in perception or in recognition memory 
better predicted with agent-dependent or 
agent-independent priors? These, I think, 
are all interesting questions worthy of being 
examined, and for which the HPM needs 
to find an answer if it really attempts to be 
a “unifying explanatory framework” for 
both agent and non-agent level cognitive 
phenomena4.
4Many thanks to Timothy F. Brady, Shamindra Fer-
nando, Justin Jungé, and Daniel L. Schacter for helpful 
comments.
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Notwithstanding Anderson and 
Schooler’s impressive results, priors based 
on statistical distributions of limited envi-
ronments do not seem to capture the full 
complexity of human memory retrieval. 
Recently, however, Hemmer and Steyvers 
(2009b, see also Hemmer and Steyvers, 
2009a) tried a different tack. They obtained 
the prior probability of remembering the 
size of a certain object from the statistical 
distribution of participant’s responses on a 
norming phase, in which relative size judg-
ments on a number of objects had to be 
performed. Thus, instead of   determining 
the prior by collecting data from the par-
ticipant’s size-judgment behavior before the 
study, they did it via generating a probabil-
ity distribution from the participants’ judg-
ments themselves. This model allowed them 
to predict with remarkable accuracy hits and 
false alarms in a recognition test, as partici-
pant’s responses approximated the means of 
the prior distribution for each item.
So far I’ve tried to draw parallels between 
ACT-R inspired Bayesian models on mem-
ory retrieval and Clark’s HPM approach as 
a way to show that his explanatory frame-
work can be extended to an offline cogni-
tive process such as remembering. But in 
so doing I intentionally drew a stark con-
trast between the way in which Anderson 
and Schooler obtained prior probabilities 
and likelihood rates, and the way in which 
Hemmer and Steyvers did, because I think 
this difference illustrates a difficult chal-
lenge for the HPM framework. According 
to Clark, although the HPM approach is 
primarily thought of as describing the 
way in which the brain aims at reducing 
surprisal at anon-agential level, these very 
same processes may help to understand the 
agent-level experience of surprise reduc-
tion – the experience of sensing a stimulus 
as the least surprising (“surprisal-ing”!, p. 
47). But this agent/non-agent gap may be 
difficult to bridge. Indeed, Clark himself 
acknowledges this difficulty when he says:
“[T]here seems to be a large disconnect 
between ‘surprisal’ (the implausibility of 
some sensory state given a model of the 
world) and agent-level surprise. This is 
evident from the simple fact that the per-
cept that, overall, best minimizes surprisal 
(hence minimizes prediction errors) ‘for’ 
the brain may well be, for me the agent, 
some highly surprising and unexpected 
state of affairs” (p. 46).
Nonetheless,  Clark (in press) believes 
that the two levels “are easily reconciled” 
when one recognizes that what appears to 
the agent as a surprising event may just be, 
in reality, only improbable. The agent might 
not have been expecting to experience some 
mental content or another, but from the 
point of view of the brain, such a content 
may actually be perfectly predictable.
I find Clark’s response unsatisfying, for 
this surprise-surprisal gap – this “surpris-
ing gap” – between the agent and the non-
agent levels is likely to occur more often 
than Clark assumes, and the frequency of 
this occurrence puts pressure on Clark to 
come up with a clearer explanation as to 
how HPM can in fact illuminate cogni-
tion at the agent-level. Consider the two 
approaches to generating prior probabili-
ties and likelihood ratios mentioned above. 
In the case of Anderson and Schooler, 
the approach is agent-independent, as it 
involves collecting probability distributions 
of frequency responses that are independent 
of the subject’s own frequency-  judgments. 
Likewise, priors generated from data at 
the neural level, such as those referenced 
by Clark in his essay, are also agent-
independent. Conversely, Hemmer and 
Steyver’s approach is paradigmatically 
agent-dependent, as it involves generating 
a probability distribution from the partici-
pant’s own frequency-judgments. However, 
we have plenty of evidence showing that 
what we think is most frequent does not 
always correspond to what it is actually most 
frequent (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, but 
see Manis et al., 1993). Moreover, the agent/
non-agent mismatch that gives rise to this 
“surprising gap” may actually occur even 
when there is no experience of surprise at 
the agent-level. It may occur, for instance, 
when there is a prediction mismatch due 
to independent processes of prior updat-
ing at the agential and non-agential levels. 
As a result, although models with agent-
independent priors may be equally good at 
fitting data as models with agent-dependent 
priors, they need not be, and it is an open 
empirical question whether or not they 
do – a question that cannot be simply dis-
missed on a priori grounds, as Clark does. So 
it seems to me that studying this surprising 
gap is itself an exciting avenue for future 
research. Why are there percepts that may 
appear surprising to the agent? What are the 
conditions under which surprise reduction 
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